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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last twenty years, the field of securities litigation has
undergone a massive overhaul. Unhappy shareholders have been
suing deep-pocketed defendants on an unprecedented level, often
with substantial damages on the line. Both courts and legislatures
have attempted to distinguish legitimate claims from mere vexatious
litigation, but the line remains blurred. Since 2006, the Roberts Court
has issued eight opinions on this topic, ranging from the reach of
federal securities law, to class certification for securities fraud claims,
1
to loss causation. In deciding Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, the
Supreme Court aims to bring clarity to this jurisprudence.
In Proskauer, the Supreme Court will determine the proper scope
2
of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA).
SLUSA, which was passed in 1998, precludes state law private class
actions that allege “a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact
3
in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.” The
Supreme Court previously held that “[i]t is enough that the scheme to
4
defraud and the sale of securities coincide.” However, because the
Court did not clearly define the term “coincide,” there is looming
uncertainty in the lower courts regarding what state law class action
5
claims are now precluded by SLUSA. Proskauer will likely have
major implications for the future of securities law, as it will more
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law.
1. Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, No. 12-88 (U.S. argued Oct. 7, 2013).
2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb (West 2013).
3. Id. § 78bb(f)(1)(A).
4. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822 (2002).
5. See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Since Dabit, six of our sister
circuit courts have tried to give dimension to the ‘coincide’ requirement announced in SEC v.
Zandford and brought into the SLUSA scheme in Dabit.”), cert. granted sub nom. Proskauer
Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013).
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clearly define how close to the alleged fraud a transaction must be
before it is precluded by SLUSA.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought
suit against Allen Stanford for orchestrating one of the largest and
6
most complex Ponzi schemes in United States history. Financial
institutions managed by Mr. Stanford had encouraged investors to
buy certificates of deposits (CDs) by promising that the CDs would
yield above-market returns once they hit maturity, at which point
7
investors could withdraw funds from them. Mr. Stanford had also
misled investors by falsely assuring them that the CDs were backed
8
by liquid assets. In reality, Stanford Investment Bank (SIB) did not
have the necessary assets, reserves, and investments to meet its
liabilities, and thus was only able to cover interest and redemption
payments on its pre-existing CDs by selling new CDs to different
9
investors.
10
11
In Roland v. Green and Farr v. Green, two groups of Louisiana
investors (collectively, the Roland plaintiffs) filed separate class
actions in state court against several defendants associated with Mr.
Stanford (collectively, the SEI defendants). Among the SEI
defendants were two entities owned by Mr. Stanford—the Stanford
Trust Company and the SEI Investments Company. The Roland
plaintiffs alleged that SIB sold CDs to the Stanford Trust Company,
which in turn served as custodian for CD purchases made through
individual retirement accounts (IRA). Although the CDs themselves
were not covered securities—those listed on a regulated, national
exchange—SIB deceived investors by claiming that the CDs were
12
backed by covered securities. Moreover, the Roland plaintiffs
alleged that the SEI Investments Company purposely misrepresented
13
the value of the CDs. The SEI defendants responded by removing
6. Id. at 508.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 522.
9. Id. (citing Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 2011)).
10. Roland v. Green, No. 3:2009cv00676 (M.D. La. Aug. 21, 2009).
11. Farr v. Green, No. 3:2009cv00678 (M.D. La. Aug. 21, 2009).
12. Roland, 675 F.3d at 508–09.
13. See id. at 508 (“According to the plaintiffs, the Trust contracted with SEI to have SEI
be the administrator of the Trust, thereby making SEI responsible for reporting the value of the
CDs. Plaintiffs . . . allege misrepresentations by SEI induced them into using their IRA funds to
invest in the CDs.”).
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the case to federal court on the basis that SLUSA precluded the
14
action from being tried in state court. The Northern District of Texas
consolidated the two cases and, citing the lack of controlling Fifth
Circuit authority, employed a test set forward by the Eleventh Circuit
to determine the necessary connection between the alleged fraud and
15
the transaction in covered securities for SLUSA preclusion. Under
this test, if the grounds for the fraud claim are “in connection with the
purchase or sale” of a security as defined in the statute, the case must
16
be dismissed under SLUSA. Because the court found that the
investors’ claims satisfied the “in connection with” test, the investors’
17
claims were precluded and the action was dismissed.
Next, the district court considered two additional claims relating
to Mr. Stanford’s Ponzi scheme. A group of Latin American investors
(the Troice plaintiffs) filed separate class actions against SIB’s
insurance brokers (the Willis defendants) and SIB’s lawyers from
18
Proskauer Rose LLP (the Proskauer defendants). The Troice
plaintiffs brought their claims under Texas law, specifically accusing
the Proskauer and Willis defendants of “violations of the Texas
Securities Act, aiding and abetting these violations, and civil
19
conspiracy.” However, the Troice plaintiffs did not allege that the
20
Proskauer defendants made any misrepresentations to them directly.
After the ruling in Roland, both defendants moved to have their cases
dismissed and the district court, citing its holding in Roland,
21
acquiesced. Plaintiffs from all three cases appealed, and the Fifth
Circuit consolidated the lawsuits for the purposes of oral argument
22
and disposition. This commentary will place particular focus on the
claims against the Proskauer defendants.
14. Id. at 509.
15. Id. at 510.
16. See, e.g., Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch (IPM), 546 F.3d 1340, 1350
(11th Cir. 2008) (“Rather, to avoid preclusion under SLUSA, a claim for relief should clearly
state the ground on which it is based, and that ground cannot be one that is ‘in connection with
the purchase or sale’ of [any] security under § 10(b) and SLUSA.”).
17. Roland, 675 F.3d at 510 (discussing the district court’s finding that the Roland
plaintiffs’ “purchases of SIB CDs were induced by the misrepresentation that SIB invested in a
portfolio including SLUSA-covered securities” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
18. Id. at 509.
19. Id.
20. Id. Rather, the Proskauer defendants allegedly made misrepresentations to the SEC,
claiming that the SEC had no authority to investigate the operations of Mr. Stanford and SIB.
Id. at 524.
21. Id. at 511 (discussing the district court’s holding that SLUSA precluded the Troice
plaintiffs’ action).
22. Id.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. PSLRA and SLUSA
In 1995 Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA) in the hopes that it would combat “perceived abuses of
the class-action vehicle in litigation involving nationally traded
23
securities.” Arguably the most profound impact of PSLRA was that
it “impose[d] heightened pleading requirements in actions brought
24
25
pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,” two of the most important
rules targeting securities fraud. Although the reforms reduced the
number of frivolous lawsuits brought in federal court, they also had
an unintended effect: Many plaintiffs sought relief in state courts,
26
where PSLRA was not applicable. In 1998, Congress responded by
enacting SLUSA, which applied PSLRA at the state level, in order
“[t]o stem this shift from Federal to State courts and prevent certain
State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being
27
used to frustrate the objectives of” PSLRA. Particularly relevant to
this case, SLUSA prohibits private class actions in state court alleging
“a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with
28
the purchase or sale of a covered security.”
In passing SLUSA, Congress intended not only to prevent
plaintiffs from bypassing PSLRA, but also to recognize the
importance of traditional state police powers in regulating certain
types of securities fraud. When SLUSA was enacted, Congress
expressly noted “the importance of maintaining the vital role of state

23. Id. at 507 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81
(2006)).
24. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to “use or employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
prescribe,” in connection with the purchase or sale of certain securities, including those
registered on a national securities exchange. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2013). Rule 10b-5 is the
rule the SEC promulgated under § 10(b). Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful to use any “device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or make any misstatement or omission of material fact, in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). Courts have
interpreted § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as providing a private right of action. See Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (stating that the existence of a private right of
action under Section 10(b) . . . and Rule 10b-5 . . . is simply beyond peradventure”).
25. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
26. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82 (“Rather than face the obstacles set in their path by the
Reform Act, plaintiffs and their representatives began bringing class actions under state law,
often in state court.”).
27. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(1)(A).
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29

law in regulating non-national securities.” In particular, state law
provides an important remedy for breach of fiduciary duty that, as the
30
SEC pointed out in a recent study, is unavailable under federal law.
Additionally, circuit courts have emphasized that “[s]ince not every
instance of financial unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty will
constitute a fraudulent activity under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, federal
courts should be wary of foreclosing common law breach of fiduciary
31
duty actions which supplement existing federal or state statutes.”
B. Dabit and the “Coincide” Requirement
In 2006, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the scope of
32
SLUSA in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit. In
Dabit, a former broker and former retail customers brought a class
action in state court alleging that Merrill Lynch had breached its
contracts with its customers and its fiduciary duties to its brokers by
33
disseminating misleading research information. Specifically, the suit
alleged that Merrill Lynch had given inaccurate research and
investment recommendations to its brokers, which the brokers passed
to the bank’s retail customers, resulting in the retail customers holding
34
on to securities that were overvalued. Moreover, the brokerplaintiffs alleged that the misrepresentations damaged their
35
reputations with customers, resulting in a loss of commission fees.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court looked to Blue Chip
36
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, in which it highlighted the
“widespread recognition that suits by nonpurchasers and nonsellers
37
present a special risk of vexatious litigation” to companies. The
Dabit Court noted that the same concern was echoed by Congress

29. S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 8 (1998) (noting “that in order to avoid . . . thwarting . . . the
purpose of the [PSLRA], national standards for nationally traded securities must be enacted,
while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of state regulators, and the right of
individuals to bring suit”).
30. See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS 54 (2011), available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
31. See, e.g., Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1043, 1049 (11th Cir.
1987).
32. 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
33. Id. at 75.
34. Id. A “holder” class action is distinct from a “typical Rule 10b-5 class action in only
one respect: It is brought by holders instead of purchasers or sellers.” Id. at 89.
35. Id. at 76.
36. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
37. Id. at 740.
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38

when it passed both PSLRA and SLUSA. Additionally, prior cases
had construed the “in connection with” language used in § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 broadly, and applied this precedent to determine that
under SLUSA, preclusion applies when fraud merely “coincides” with
39
the securities transaction. Congress had not only used the same
words in enacting SLUSA as it did in § 10(b), but also had “used them
40
in a provision that appears in the same statute as § 10(b).” Based on
these principles, the Dabit Court held that SLUSA’s “in connection
with” requirement possesses the same meaning as that of § 10(b), and
41
that state-law holder class actions are also precluded under SLUSA.
C. Circuit Courts Struggle with Dabit
Since the Dabit decision, no fewer than six different circuit courts
have attempted to define the scope of SLUSA’s “coincide”
42
requirement. The Eleventh Circuit, in Instituto de Prevision Militar v.
43
Merrill Lynch, held that the “coincide” requirement is met if either
“fraud that induced [plaintiffs] to invest with [the defendant(s)] or a
fraudulent scheme . . . coincided and depended upon the purchase or
44
sale of [covered] securities.” There, a Guatemalan government
agency, which had administered a pension for the country’s military
45
veterans, brought claims against Merrill Lynch. The agency had
invested in the Pension Fund of America (PFA) and, along with other
PFA investors, sued Merrill Lynch for “actively promot[ing] PFA and
46
vouching for the character of PFA’s principals.” The Eleventh Circuit
ruled in favor of the defendants, holding that SLUSA precluded the
38. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that prior to the
enactment of PSLRA, “nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious
discovery requests, and ‘manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they
purportedly represent’ had become rampant” (citation omitted)).
39. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85 (“Under our precedents, it is enough that the fraud alleged
‘coincide’ with a securities transaction—whether by the plaintiff or by someone else.” (citing
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997))).
40. See id. at 96 (noting that “Congress can hardly have been unaware of the broad
construction adopted by both this Court and the SEC when it imported the key phrase—‘in
connection with the purchase or sale’—into SLUSA’s core provision”).
41. See id. at 89 (“The misconduct of which respondent complains here—fraudulent
manipulation of stock prices—unquestionably qualifies as fraud ‘in connection with the
purchase or sale’ of securities . . . .”).
42. See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Since Dabit, six of our sister
circuit courts have tried to give dimension to the ‘coincide’ requirement . . . .”), cert. granted sub
nom. Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013).
43. 546 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2008).
44. Id. at 1349.
45. Id. at 1342.
46. Id. at 1343 (alteration in original).
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agency’s claims because their complaint was about “fraud that
induced it to invest with PFA, which means that its claims [we]re ‘in
47
connection with the purchase or sale’ of a security under SLUSA.”
48
The Ninth Circuit, in Madden v. Cowen & Co., interpreted the
49
“coincide” requirement slightly differently. In Madden, the plaintiffs
were shareholders of two medical care providers that were looking to
50
be bought by a larger company. The plaintiffs had retained an
51
investment bank to help them look for prospective buyers. And the
investment bank had suggested a stock-swap merger with a publicly
traded company. However, the publicly traded company’s stock
52
tumbled soon after it acquired the plaintiffs’ companies. The
plaintiffs then sued the investment bank in state court for negligent
53
misrepresentation and professional negligence. Looking to Dabit’s
ruling that SLUSA must be interpreted in the same light as § 10(b),
the court concluded that the “coincide” requirement is met if the
alleged fraud and the sale of stock are “more than tangentially
54
related.” Applying this test, the court determined that the
“misrepresentations and omissions alleged . . . [were] more than
tangentially related to [the shareholders’] purchase of the [publiclytraded company’s] securities,” and thus the class action was
55
precluded.
56
Most recently, the Second Circuit in Romano v. Kazacos held
that the “coincide” requirement is met when the “plaintiff’s claims
‘turn on injuries caused by acting on misleading investment advice’—
that is, where plaintiff’s claims ‘necessarily allege,’ ‘necessarily
57
involve,’ or ‘rest on’ the purchase or sale of securities.” There,
retirees of Xerox and Kodak alleged that defendant Morgan Stanley
“misrepresented that if appellants were to retire early, their
investment savings would be sufficient to support them through
47. Id. at 1349.
48. 576 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009).
49. See id. at 965–66 (“Under our Section 10(b) cases, a misrepresentation is ‘in
connection with’ the purchase or sale of securities if there is ‘a relationship in which the fraud
and the stock sale coincide or are more than tangentially related.’” (quoting Falkowski v.
Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002))).
50. Id. at 962.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 962–63.
53. Id. at 963.
54. Id. at 965–66.
55. Id. at 966 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. 609 F.3d 512 (2d Cir. 2010).
57. Id. at 522 (citation omitted).
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58

retirement.” As a result, the retirees had “deposited their retirement
savings into Morgan Stanley IRA accounts, where covered securities
59
were purchased on their behalf.” The court found that SLUSA
preclusion applied because the defendants had fraudulently induced
the appellants into investing in securities by misleading them about
60
future returns.
IV. HOLDING
After reviewing both Dabit and the legislative history of PSLRA
and SLUSA, the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether the “in connection
61
with” requirement of SLUSA precluded the plaintiffs’ claims. The
circuit court adopted the view of the Ninth Circuit and ruled that the
SEI and Willis defendants’ actions were too far removed from the
62
securities transaction to satisfy SLUSA’s “coincide” requirement.
63
The Fifth Circuit thus reversed the district court’s ruling.
Additionally, with regard to the aiding and abetting claims against the
Proskauer defendants, the court concluded that because the alleged
misrepresentations were even further removed from the
misrepresentations made by the other defendants, SLUSA preclusion
64
did not apply.
A. The “In Connection With” Requirement
The Fifth Circuit noted that courts “do not write on a blank slate”
in determining the scope of the “in connection with” requirement of
65
SLUSA. Using the same line of reasoning as the Supreme Court in
66
Dabit, the circuit court concluded that Congress had intended the
“in connection with” requirement to be interpreted in the same
67
manner as in § 10(b).

58. Id. at 515.
59. Id. at 520.
60. See id. at 523.
61. See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 518 (5th Cir. 2012) (“It is against this backdrop that
we must go about formulating our standard for judging the connection of claims like the
Appellants' to the purchase or sale of covered securities.”), cert. granted sub nom. Proskauer
Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013).
.
62 Id. at 519–20, 522.
63. Id. at 523.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 511.
66. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85-86 (2006).
67. Roland, 675 F.3d at 512.

GIRIDHARAN 1.12.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

DECIPHERING THE PROPER SCOPE OF SLUSA

1/12/2014 7:56 PM

91

The Fifth Circuit also found “Congress’s explicit concern about
the distinction between national, covered securities, and other,
uncovered securities” to be very persuasive in balancing the rights of
federal and state courts to hear claims relating to securities fraud.
After analyzing the congressional record and highlighting the need to
68
respect traditional state police powers, the court concluded that
Congress intended SLUSA to apply only to “transactions involving
69
national securities.” The court reasoned that because companies do
not have any control over their stock after their initial public offering,
litigation concerning these securities should be heard at the federal
level, so that “national issuers are not subject to any of fifty different
70
state systems.”
In reaching this conclusion, however, the court noted that nonnational securities were still under state law jurisdiction and thus were
71
not unregulated. In enacting PSLRA and SLUSA, Congress had to
balance the need for “national standards for securities class action
lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while preserving the
appropriate enforcement powers of State securities regulators and not
72
changing the current treatment of individual lawsuits.” An
overbroad reading of SLUSA, Congress feared, would potentially
73
destabilize creditor-debtor regimes. Given that nearly every
company owns some covered securities, and that most are backed by a
portfolio in the same way as SIB’s CD’s, the court concluded that
following the district court’s view that preclusion should apply merely
because of some vague connection to a covered security “would be a
74
major change in the scope of SLUSA”; it would become far too easy
for a company to avoid litigation at the state level.

68. See id. at 517 (“‘[T]he securities governed by this bill—and it is important to emphasize
this point—are by definition trading on national exchanges. As we all know, securities traded on
national exchanges are bought and sold by investors in every State, and those investors rely on
information distributed on a national basis.’” (quoting 144 CONG. REC. 4799 (1998) (statement
of Sen. Joseph Lieberman))); see also 144 CONG. REC. 10780 (1998) (statement of Rep. Anna
Eshoo) (“This legislation is limited in scope and only affects class action lawsuits involving
nationally traded securities.”).
69. Roland, 675 F.3d at 517.
70. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
71. Roland, 675 F.3d at 518.
72. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 2.
73. Id.; see also Janvey v. Adams, 588 F.3d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 2009).
74. Roland, 675 F.3d at 518.
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In determining when a claim is precluded by SLUSA, the court
reasoned that the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit cases were
most relevant to defining the “coincide” requirement because these
75
courts had previously considered the issue. The court began with the
Eleventh Circuit test, which “identifies the two different perspectives
76
from which courts approach the question of connectivity.” The first
perspective analyzes the claims from the plaintiff’s perspective, by
asking whether the plaintiffs were induced into believing that they
were either investing in covered securities or investing in transactions
because of representations regarding transactions in covered
77
securities. Conversely, the second perspective looks at the allegations
from the view of the defendant, and asks whether or not the
defendant would have still committed the fraud without the alleged
78
covered securities transaction. The court reasoned that a plaintifforiented perspective unnecessarily imported a causation requirement
79
into SLUSA analysis and that the defendant-oriented perspective
80
was more in line with the Court’s statements in Dabit.
After concluding that “the defendant-oriented perspective is the
81
proper point of view from which to consider the allegations,” the
Fifth Circuit eliminated the Second and Eleventh Circuit tests
82
because each was “too stringent a standard.” Instead, the court
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s test from Madden as the “best articulation
of the ‘coincide’ requirement” because it followed Supreme Court
75. See id. at 513 (“The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have, however, attempted to
give dimension to what is sufficiently connected/coincidental to a transaction in covered
securities to trigger SLUSA preclusion.”).
76. See id. at 518–19 (“IPM held that the ‘coincide’ requirement is met if either ‘fraud . . .
induced [plaintiffs] to invest with [the defendant(s)]’ or ‘a fraudulent scheme . . . coincided and
depended upon the purchase or sale of [covered] securities.’” (quoting IPM, 546 F.3d 1340 (11th
Cir 2008))).
77. See IPM, 546 F.3d at 1349 (focusing on whether the complaint alleged a “fraud . . .
[that] induced [plaintiffs] to invest with [the defendant(s)]” or “a fraudulent scheme . . . [that]
coincided and depended upon the purchase or sale of [covered] securities”).
78. See Roland, 675 F.3d at 519 (“The ‘depended upon’ prong . . . essentially ask[s] whether
the defendants' fraudulent scheme would have been successful without the (representations
about) transactions in covered securities.”).
79. See id. (“By tying the ‘coincide’ requirement to ‘inducement,’ [the plaintiffs’
perspective] unnecessarily imports causation into a test whose language (‘coincide’) specifically
disclaims it.”).
80. Id. (“The defendant-oriented perspective, like IPM's ‘depends upon’ prong, is more
faithful to the Court's statement that ‘[t]he requisite showing ... is deception in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security, not deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller.’”
(quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006))).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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precedent while simultaneously giving due weight to the major policy
83
and legislative concerns underlying SLUSA. In particular, the court
noted that the Madden test prevented SLUSA from being “construed
so broadly as to [encompass] every common-law fraud that happens
84
to involve [covered] securities.” The Fifth Circuit concluded that in
order for SLUSA preclusion to apply, the fraud would have to be
“more than tangentially related to (real or purported) transactions in
85
covered securities.”
Although the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court’s
determination that “the CDs were uncovered securities,” they felt that
it was necessary to further scrutinize the “schemes and purposes of
86
the frauds alleged by the Roland Plaintiffs.” In applying the Madden
test, the Fifth Circuit noted that the actual “heart” of the fraud was
SIB’s misrepresentation to investors that the CDs were a “safe and
87
secure” investment. Although the district court reasoned that the
plaintiffs’ claims were precluded because the CDs were backed in
part by “covered securities,” the Fifth Circuit instead concluded that it
was “but one of a host of (mis)representations made to the plaintiffs
88
in an attempt to lure them into buying the worthless CDs.” Similarly,
the fact that the CDs were marketed with references to SIB’s
portfolio was considered too vague and “tangential to the schemes
89
advanced by the SEI and Willis Defendants.” Finally, although a few
plaintiffs sold covered securities in order to finance the purchase of
the CDs, this only constituted a tangential relationship because SIB
90
did not directly convince the investors to sell the securities.

83. Id. at 519–20 (citing Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2009)).
84. Id. at 512 (quoting SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002)).
85. Id. at 520.
86. Id. at 521.
87. Id. at 522 (“For example, as alleged by the Roland Plaintiffs, the CDs were principally
promoted as being preferable to other investments because of their liquidity, consistently high
rates of return, and the fact that SEI and other regulators were keeping a watchful eye on
SIB.”).
88. Id. at 521.
89. Id. at 522.
90. See id. at 523 (“[Unlike cases in which] the entirety of the fraud depended upon the
tortfeasor convincing the victims of those fraudulent schemes to sell their covered securities in
order for the fraud to be accomplished, the allegations here are not so tied with the sale of
covered securities.”).
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B. Aiding and Abetting
Next, the Fifth Circuit ruled that SLUSA did not preclude the
91
aiding and abetting claims against the Proskauer defendants. The
court viewed the claims against the Proskauer defendants as
“different from those alleged against the other defendants” in that the
plaintiffs did not allege that the Proskauer defendants made any
92
misrepresentations to them personally. Instead, the court focused on
Proskauer’s misrepresentations to the SEC, in informing the SEC that
93
it could not investigate the operations of Mr. Stanford and SIB. The
court reasoned that because of Proskauer’s misrepresentations, the
94
fraud was allowed to continue and the Troice plaintiffs were harmed.
Based on the Ninth Circuit test, however, these actions were even
further removed from the fraud than the misrepresentation made by
95
SIB. Because the misrepresentations made by the Proskauer
defendants “were not more than tangentially related to the purchase
96
or sale of covered securities,” SLUSA preclusion did not apply.
The Supreme Court granted the Proskauer defendants’ writ of
certiorari to determine the scope of SLUSA’s “in connection with”
requirement, and specifically to determine whether it precludes a
class action brought under state law “where the alleged purchase or
sale of a covered security is more than tangentially related to the
97
heart, crux, or gravamen of the alleged fraud.”
V. ARGUMENTS
A.

Arguments for Petitioner, Proskauer Rose LLP

1. “In Connection With” does Not Equate to “Coincide”
Petitioner argues that the “coincide” test employed by the Fifth
98
Circuit is far more restrictive than Congress had intended. SLUSA
was enacted as “remedial legislation, with an expansive preclusive
91. Id. at 524.
92. Id. at 523.
93. Id. at 524.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i,
Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, No. 12-88 (U.S. July 18, 2012). The Court also granted petitions
for writ of certiorari submitted by several of the other defendants in the proceedings below.
98. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3–4, Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, No. 12-88 (U.S. Aug.
19, 2013).
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effect.” Moreover, SLUSA was intended to mirror the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of § 10(b)’s “in connection with”
100
requirement.
Petitioner argues that while the “coincide”
requirement might be sufficient to meet the requirements of § 10(b),
101
it is not a necessary factor for preclusion to apply. In addition to
102
Dabit, Petitioner relies on United States v. O’Hagan, where the
Supreme Court held that the misappropriation prong of § 10(b) was
satisfied because “the securities transaction and the breach of duty . . .
103
104
coincide[d].” Moreover, Petitioner notes that in SEC v. Zandford,
the Court stated that it is “enough that the scheme to defraud and the
105
sale of securities coincide.” In each of these cases, the Supreme
Court held that “the scope of SLUSA or § 10(b), as applicable, was
106
more expansive than the lower courts believed.” Although a
showing that the two events coincided could certainly meet SLUSA’s
requirement, the lack of such a showing does not necessarily mean
107
that the action should be precluded.
2. Legislative Intent and Policy Considerations
Petitioner argues that adopting the Fifth Circuit’s “coincide” test
108
would negatively impact the future of securities law. For example,
the Fifth Circuit ruled that the alleged fraud did not meet the
appropriate SLUSA standard due to the “multiple layers of
109
separation” between the misrepresentation and the investment.
However, complex frauds, particularly those of the magnitude carried
out by Mr. Stanford, will inevitably be comprised of such layers; to
prevent SLUSA from applying to these types of cases “simply cannot
be squared with the scope of § 10(b)’s ‘in connection with’
110
requirement as [the] Supreme Court has interpreted it.”

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Brief for Petitioner, Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, No. 12-88 (U.S. May 3, 2013).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 18.
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
Id. at 656.
535 U.S. 813 (2002).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 18 (citing Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822).
Id. at 19 (citing Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820–21).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 23–24.
Id.
Id. at 24.

GIRIDHARAN 1.12.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

96

1/12/2014 7:56 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 9

Petitioner bases much of its policy argument around the Supreme
Court’s admonition that the “in connection with” requirement be
111
given broad construction. Petitioner contends that Respondents’
own allegations “make plain that SIB’s false promise to invest
proceeds of CD sales in covered securities was part of Stanford’s
112
fraudulent scheme.” Petitioner claims that SIB’s ownership of a
portfolio of covered securities is irrelevant, as the actual
misrepresentation was made concerning the purchase of covered
113
securities. As this is what Respondents allege, the Court “need not
go beyond their averments to conclude that SIB’s misrepresentations
114
were ‘in connection with’ the purchase of covered securities.”
3. SLUSA’s “In Connection With” Requirement was Satisfied
Next, Petitioner contends that because investors were induced
into selling covered securities to finance the purchase of the CDs,
115
SLUSA’s “in connection with” requirement was met. Petitioner
claims the actual objective of the fraud scheme is not “essential to the
‘in connection with’ analysis”; once the securities transaction is a part
116
of the fraud, it is irrelevant what actually happens to the revenue.
The Supreme Court has ruled that it is irrelevant where the money
originated from, as long as “there was a ‘sale’ of a security and . . .
117
fraud was used ‘in connection with’ it.” Here, the fraud specifically
targeted individuals who were “most likely to sell ‘covered securities’
118
to buy SIB CDs.”
Consequently, Petitioner argues that Mr.
Stanford’s targeting of these individuals was integral to the
continuation of the fraud and that a covered securities transaction
119
was therefore foreseeable.
Similarly, Petitioner alleges that Mr. Stanford’s misrepresentations
concerning investing revenue from CD sales in “covered securities”
120
are sufficient to meet the “in connection” requirement of SLUSA.
Mr. Stanford’s brokers and advisors had been told that the
111. Id. at 13.
112. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 98, at 11.
113. Id. at 13–14.
114. Id. at 14.
115. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 33–34.
116. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 98, at 7.
117. Id. at 8 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Case. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 12 (1971)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id at 14–15.

GIRIDHARAN 1.12.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

DECIPHERING THE PROPER SCOPE OF SLUSA

1/12/2014 7:56 PM

97

“liquidity/marketability of SIB’s invested assets” was the “most
121
important factor to provide security to SIB clients.” Coupled with
the fact that the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the “in
connection with” requirement broadly, Petitioner claims that these
misrepresentations are sufficiently close to the alleged fraud to
122
warrant SLUSA preclusion.
4. Aiding and Abetting
Finally, with regard to the “aiding and abetting” claims, Petitioner
argues that part of Congress’s intent in enacting SLUSA was to
prevent deep-pocketed defendants from being targeted for private
123
litigation. However, if such litigation were to encompass third-party
companies as well, defendants would find it difficult to obtain help
124
from professionals due to the increased cost of doing business.
Lawyers, Petitioner argues, would “find their loyalties divided
between the interests of their clients and their own financial interests
125
in avoiding exposure to vexatious lawsuits.” In keeping with the
legislative intent of SLUSA, Petitioner contends that the aiding and
126
abetting claims against Proskauer must be preempted as well.
B. Arguments for Respondents, Aggrieved Investors
1. “In Connection With” Must be Construed Narrowly
Respondents argue that neither their supposed sale of covered
securities to purchase the CDs nor SIB’s claim that it owned a
127
portfolio of liquid assets triggered preclusion under SLUSA.
Furthermore, the SEI defendants’ actions fail to meet the “coincide”
128
requirement as set by Dabit. The allegations merely stated that SIB
121. Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 11. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 (2002) (noting that a
misrepresentation and securities transaction need only “coincide” to be sufficiently connected);
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y., 404 U.S. at 12 (holding that the two need only “touch”).
123. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 21–22.
124. Id. at 23 (“Not only does the availability of liability insurance enhance the risk that law
firms will be targeted as deep pockets, the cost of securing insurance will certainly increase,
resulting in increased costs to clients and clients’ investors.” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
125. Id. at 24.
126. Id.
127. Brief of Respondents at 19–22, Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, Nos. 12-79, 12-86 and
12-88 (U.S. July 18, 2013) (rejecting Petitioner’s claim that because at least one of the
Respondents allegedly sold covered securities to purchase the CDs, SLUSA preclusion applies).
128. See id. at 8 (“SIB did not make its misrepresentations contemporaneously with . . . the
same transaction as its separate supposed purchase of ‘liquid assets’; the two thus did not
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told its employees to push the CDs, not that the objective of the fraud
129
was to steal the covered securities. Given that “securities laws do
apply to a scheme in which the victim is induced to sell securities and
130
then deprived of the proceeds,” the employees were not concerned
131
about the origins of the money used to purchase the CDs. Therefore,
Respondents contend, SIB’s actions are at most tangentially related
to the fraud.
Similarly, Respondents claim that because the portfolio consisted
only marginally of covered securities, applying SLUSA preclusion
132
would lead to absurd results. Under this interpretation, companies
would be able to avoid liability simply by mentioning some vague
relationship to “covered securities” when marketing products to
133
investors.
Yet, simply making misrepresentations concerning
covered securities that SIB “held” would be insufficient to trigger
134
preclusion under federal securities law as well.
Because the
supposed covered securities had already been “purchased” by the
time SIB made its misrepresentations to investors, the “in connection
135
with” requirement was not met.
2. Cases Presented by Petitioner are Irrelevant
Additionally, Respondents contend that the “in connection with”
interpretation under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has never been
interpreted in the manner Petitioner advances. No decision has
extended the statute and rule to cases where a non-security was
fraudulently sold after “the seller misrepresent[ed] its intent to buy
covered securities in which no other party w[ould] hold any
136
interest.” Instead, Petitioner focuses on cases where the “victim
137
arguably purchases a share of the covered securities themselves,”
“the defendant’s misrepresentations manipulated the market for

‘coincide.’”).
129. Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
130. Id. (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Case. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971)).
131. Id. (citation omitted).
132. Id. at 20–21.
133. See id. at 11 (“On petitioner’s reading, every false statement about securities
ownership—whether in a credit application, a job interview, or anywhere else—potentially
constitutes securities fraud.”).
134. Id. at 22 (“The federal securities laws . . . apply only to misrepresentations in
connection with the ‘purchase or sale’ of regulated securities.”).
135. Id. at 24–25.
136. Id. at 12.
137. Id. at 16.
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138

covered securities,” or “plaintiffs lost money when funds ostensibly
139
invested for their benefit were misappropriated.” Respondents
conclude that Petitioner is unable to find a relevant case because the
misrepresentation here was merely tangentially related to a covered
140
securities transaction and, therefore, SLUSA does not apply.
3. SLUSA’s Scope of Protections Differs from that of § 10(b)
Finally, Respondents argue that holding in favor of Petitioner
141
would undermine the legislative intent behind SLUSA. The “courts
should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not
superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
142
Congress.’” However, Respondents argue that it was “Congress’s
decision in SLUSA to preserve—not to override or displace—the
143
states’ historical role in providing civil remedies for fraud.” In fact,
though Congress premised SLUSA’s scope on § 10(b), it specifically
noted that SLUSA only applied to “covered securities” whereas §
144
10(b) encompassed all securities. Moreover, when Congress adopted
the phrase and definition of “covered security,” Congress specifically
mentioned that it did not intend “to alter, limit, expand, or otherwise
affect in any way any State statutory or common law with respect to
fraud or deceit . . . in connection with securities or securities
145
transactions.” Thus, although Congress may have modeled SLUSA’s
“in connection with” requirement after § 10(b), Respondents argue
that adopting Petitioner’s interpretations would go against legislative
intent and impede the traditional rights of states to regulate nonnational securities.

138. Id. at 39 (citing U.S. Mortgage, Inc. v. Saxton, 494 F.3d 833, 845 (9th Cir. 2007)).
139. Id. at 33 (citing Grippo v. Perazzo, 357 F.3d 1218, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 2004)).
140. See id. at 34 (“Petitioner’s inability to cite a single case on point is no surprise. The
securities laws do not apply to a party’s sale of a non-covered asset through a false statement of
an intention later to buy a covered security for itself.”).
141. See id. at 11 (noting that “Congress did not intend to undo the established allocation of
federal and state regulatory authority” by allowing any false statement about securities
ownership to constitute securities fraud).
142. Id. at 28–29 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
143. Id. at 43–44.
144. Id. at 21.
145. Id. at 45 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 34 (1996)).
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VI. ANALYSIS
In deciding Proskauer, the Supreme Court must balance the broad
interpretation of § 10(b) as stated in Dabit with the traditional power
146
of states to regulate the use of class actions as a consumer remedy.
The Supreme Court should hold for Respondents and affirm the Fifth
Circuit’s ruling because the misrepresentations made by SIB were not
directly “in connection with” a purchase or sale of securities.
Proskauer is distinguishable from precedent cited by Petitioner as the
147
misstatements did not “coincide” with a securities transaction.
Moreover, from a policy perspective, holding in favor of Respondents
will preserve the important balance of power between the federal and
state in adjudicating securities fraud. Even though a broad
interpretation of the “coincide” requirement would only preclude
state law class actions, in practice, the cost of individual litigation
would be prohibitively expensive to be a feasible alternative to class
148
actions.
In addition, the Court should hold that the aiding and
abetting claims against the Proskauer defendants are not precluded,
as the Proskauer defendants’ actions are even further removed from
the sale or purchase of covered securities.
A. Monitoring the Scope of SLUSA
Due to the strong policy justifications of SLUSA, the Supreme
Court will likely place great weight on legislative intent. The
legislative history demonstrates that Congress had a strong interest in
“preserving the appropriate enforcement power of state regulators
149
and the right of individuals to bring suit.” And a reasonably narrow
interpretation of the “coincide” requirement protects both interests.
Moreover, adopting Petitioner’s argument and precluding all state
action that “bears only an attenuated connection to the challenged
transaction” would inevitably curtail the ability of states to regulate
146. See, e.g., Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (“So we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not superseded . . . unless that was clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”).
147. Brief of Respondents, supra note 127, at 37 (“Petitioner never offers a theory of how a
statement like SIB’s could be material to its own purchase or sale of a covered security.”).
148. Brief of Sixteen Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 17,
Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, Nos. 12-79, 12-86 and 12-88 (U.S. July 24, 2013) [hereinafter
Brief of Sixteen Law Professors] (“Denial of class relief under both federal and state law as a
matter of statutory interpretation would mean no relief at all.”).
149. S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 8 (1998); see also 144 CONG. REC. S4791 (1998) (statement of
Sen. Chris Dodd) (“It will not affect any suit, class action or otherwise, against penny stocks or
any stock that is not traded on a national exchange.”).

GIRIDHARAN 1.12.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

DECIPHERING THE PROPER SCOPE OF SLUSA

1/12/2014 7:56 PM

101
150

corporate laws that have traditionally been within their jurisdiction.
Furthermore, prior Supreme Court cases point to a strong
presumption against federal preemption of state law causes of
151
action, further supporting a narrower reading of “coincide.” Given
that “every bank and almost every company owns some covered
152
securities,” the Supreme Court should not allow preemption to
extend as far as Petitioner claims it does.
The Court has also held that SLUSA applies only to
misrepresentations that are “in connection with the purchase or sale
153
of a covered security,” as opposed to simply being in connection
154
with a security itself. Respondents invested money in CDs, but there
was no actual transaction with regard to such securities. Furthermore,
as the Fifth Circuit noted, allowing SLUSA to apply here merely
because Petitioner deceived investors into believing that the CDs
were backed by covered securities would allow any defendant to
avoid liability for securities fraud simply by mentioning any type of
155
relationship to covered securities during a marketing pitch.
Moreover, the Supreme Court emphasized that the “scope of SLUSA
is about the security, rather than either the issuer or the alleged
156
fraud.” Therefore, in applying the rule, the nature of the investment
itself is most crucial. Here, Respondents merely bought CDs from
SIB, and in so doing, “no one intended that any party to the
157
transaction would obtain any interest in any covered security.”

150. Brief of Sixteen Law Professors, supra note 148, at 3.
151. Id. at 19 (“The presumption against preemption is particularly strong where a
conclusion that claims are preempted would eliminate remedies traditionally available under
state law.”); see also Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (“If Congress
had intended to deprive injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely
would have expressed that intent more clearly.”).
152. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 518 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Proskauer
Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013).
153. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002).
154. See, e.g., id. at 822 (ruling that the securities fraud must “coincide” with a securities
transaction). Previous cases required, “at a minimum, a direct or indirect purchase or sale of
covered securities, or a contract to do so.” Brief of Sixteen Law Professors, supra note 148, at
12–13.
155. Roland, 675 F.3d at 522 (“Precluding any group claim against any such debt issue
merely because the issuer advertises that it owns these assets in its portfolio would be a major
change in the scope of SLUSA.”).
156. Brief of Sixteen Law Professors, supra note 148, at 28 (alteration in original) (citing
Morrison v. Aust. Nat’l Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010)).
157. Id. at 29.

GIRIDHARAN 1.12.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

102

1/12/2014 7:56 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 9

B. Aiding and Abetting
If the Supreme Court rules that the misrepresentations made by
SIB were too far removed from the covered securities transaction to
be precluded by SLUSA, then the argument for precluding the claims
against the Proskauer defendants are even more tenuous. Though
Petitioner claims that SIB misrepresented the “liquidity, soundness,
158
and safety of investing in the CDs,” The Proskauer defendants made
no direct misrepresentation to Respondents. Furthermore, because
aiding and abetting claims traditionally have been adjudicated under
state law, public policy would further direct the Court to rule in favor
of Respondents.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should affirm the Fifth Circuit’s decision and
hold that SLUSA precludes an action where the alleged purchase or
sale of a covered security is not “more than tangentially related” to
159
the “heart, crux, or gravamen” of the alleged fraud. The Court
should limit the scope of SLUSA in order to ensure that traditional
state police powers—including the ability to regulate consumer
remedies such as class action lawsuits and the internal workings of
corporations with sufficient ties to the state—are kept intact. If the
Court were to hold otherwise, the implications for many investment
vehicles that merely “touch” covered securities could be quite
substantial. Companies would find themselves able to avoid class
actions through SLUSA preclusion simply by claiming some type of
relationship to covered securities. There is little to suggest Congress
intended such a result.

158. Roland, 675 F.3d at 523.
159. See id. at 521 (“[W]e find the references to SIB’s portfolio being backed by ‘covered
securities’ to be merely tangentially related to the ‘heart,’ ‘crux,’ or ‘gravamen’ of the
defendants’ fraud.”).

